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fileEURA 5002/93
29 January 1993**EYES ONLY DCI-Designate, A/DCI****MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD****SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on the Former
Yugoslavia, 28 January 1993**

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1. This initial organizational session aimed to: determine baseline USG policy as inherited from the Bush Administration or articulated during the Clinton campaign, establish necessary interagency working groups, and identify policy options. Tony Lake sternly admonished the group against leaks (as appeared in today's Post, attached). DCI-Designate Woolsey directed me to prepare minutes of the meeting for you and him only. (S)

2. **Establishing Baseline Policy.** General Powell and Ambassador Wisner, highlighting the London Accords and then-Secretary Eagleburger's Christmas demarche, helped to define positions of the Bush Administration: to deliver humanitarian assistance (using air power if necessary), support UN/EC mediation (but not necessarily the Vance-Owen proposals), refuse to accept borders changed by force or to legitimize ethnic cleansing, condemn war crimes, seek No-Fly enforcement, and arm the Bosnian Muslims (which the Allies refused to do).

-- Sandy Berger noted that President Clinton during the campaign called for: enforcing No-Fly, being more aggressive about delivering relief assistance, and considering lifting the arms ban on Bosnia. (S)

3. **Getting Organized.** NSC Senior Director for Europe Jenonne Walker will chair an interagency group to identify and evaluate policy options. The group will prepare a close-hold paper, with Jenonne retaining the sole working copy. (I will attend the first session today at 11 AM.) The effort aims at a Principals Committee meeting as early as mid-week.

-- Tony Lake also suggested a working group on tightening sanctions (a group already exists under State's chair). Running out of time, Lake hurriedly asked Secretary Christopher to prepare recommendations on three

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immediate challenges: gaining renewal of the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia, handling the Macedonian application for UN membership, and averting a pullout or drawdown of UNPROFOR in Bosnia. (S)

4. **Policy Options.** Lake wants to frame policy options according to three (somewhat vaguely defined) phases of escalating pressures on Serbia:

- **Category 1: Actions doable soon without upsetting key partners (the UK, France, and Russia).** Ideas include: increasing humanitarian donations and considering airdrops of supplies, demanding access to all detention camps, and immediate release of all female prisoners.
- **Category 2: Initiatives probably doable with Allied cooperation but with difficulty and cost.** Suggestions include: increasing use of Ploce port and repairing the rail line to Sarajevo, tightening sanctions (especially on oil and financial transfers) and compensating Serbia's neighbors (especially Macedonia), seizing Serbian ships that violate sanctions, broadcasting into Serbia (using RFE or DOD assets), developing military-to-military ties, raising the profile on war crimes, cutting Serbian telecommunications links, and putting more monitors into Kosovo (plus Macedonia and Albania).
- **Category 3: Actions involving the threat or application of strong military force.** Possibilities include: enforcing No-Fly (by hitting air targets or airfields), lifting the arms embargo in Bosnia (at least for light weapons), "unleashing" UNPROFOR, protecting relief convoys with airpower, [redacted] sequestering all heavy weapons, demilitarizing Sarajevo (thereafter inserting 20,000 US/UK troops to protect it). (S)

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5. Lake wants to defer until spring any action that might jeopardize the relief effort. All agreed with Mr. Woolsey not to diplomatically isolate Serbia [redacted]

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6. Persuasive Force, Option 3. Toward the conclusion of the meeting, General Powell briefed on the most forceful of three contingency plans already developed for US military action in the former Yugoslavia. The plan would attack counter-military, -industrial, and -regime targets in Bosnia and Serbia-Montenegro. The first round of targets would include Banja Luka and Zaluzani airports, naval facilities in Montenegro, artillery around Sarajevo, facilities associated with Bosnian Serb headquarters at Pale, and some military or industrial facilities in northern Serbia. Several Italian airbases and two carriers would be required. Follow-on attacks could hit tactical targets. Friendly losses would be low, but civilian casualties would be high; large refugees flows would result. The public outcry would be great, key Allies might not participate, and "the Russians would go nuts," according to General Powell. (S)

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Daniel W. Wagner
Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

Attachment:
Washington Post Article
28 January 1993

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The Washington Post
News Bulletin 28 January 1993
Page A16

U.S. to Study Wider Options on Balkans

Clinton Administration Orders Interagency Review of Possible Actions

By John M. Goshko
and Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writers

In its first foray into foreign policy crisis management, the Clinton administration has expanded U.S. consideration of potential actions in the Balkans civil war beyond the limited objectives pursued by the Bush administration.

U.S. officials said yesterday that an interagency study ordered by the National Security Council late last week asked for an assessment of what would happen in Bosnia-Herzegovina and other parts of the former Yugoslavia if U.S. policy remains unchanged. It also asked how much military force would be required to lift the long-standing Serb siege of Bosnia's capital, Sarajevo, and to open the roads to unrestricted passage of relief supplies throughout the republic.

These were among dozens of questions posed by the new NSC staff in preparation for a planned meeting this week of Clinton's top foreign and defense advisers and leading up to a full-scale NSC meeting, tentatively scheduled for next week, that would include the president.

The study, described by one official as "a comprehensive, wall-to-wall approach" to every aspect of the Balkans conflict, includes taking a new look at ideas considered by the Bush administration.

These include such options as shooting down Serb aircraft invading the "no-fly zone" that the United Nations has decreed over Bosnia,

bombing Serb airfields and artillery positions, modifying the U.N. arms embargo to enable Bosnia's Muslim-controlled government to obtain more weapons, using U.N. peace-keeping forces to prevent Serbian-inspired aggression from spreading to Kosovo and Macedonia and establishing an international war

Bosnia "does seem to be a place where the United States needs to be activist and internationalist in our outlook."

—Warren M. Christopher,
secretary of state

crimes commission to identify and deal with perpetrators of atrocities.

But, the officials added, the unusually broad list of questions and options that were sent to the state and defense departments and the CIA suggested that the new administration is willing at least to consider a greatly expanded U.S. and international role in the Balkans.

During the presidential campaign, Clinton called for a more activist approach. But the officials cautioned that it was not possible to predict what conclusions the new administration might draw from the study and what changes Clinton would order in U.S. policy.

Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher, talking with reporters following a private meeting with the House Foreign Affairs Committee, refused to discuss specific options. But he recalled Clinton's campaign remarks and said that Bosnia "does seem to be a place where the United States needs to be activist and internationalist in our outlook."

However, Clinton may be inhibited, as was President George Bush before him, by the reluctance of Britain, France and Russia—all of which are permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—to agree to tougher measures.

Bosnia's ambassador to the United Nations, Mohamed Sacirbey, accused the Bush administration of making "a halfhearted effort" to deal with the crisis as the inauguration neared. Speaking to reporters at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Sacirbey said Clinton administration officials left the impression that "we should not be disappointed" by the results of their policy review.

On Capitol Hill, a non-binding resolution being circulated in both the Senate and the House called for stronger U.S. action in the Balkans, including the use of military airpower to enforce the "no-fly zone" over Bosnia and to require Serb forces to place their heavy weapons under international monitoring.

Among the resolution's sponsors are Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell (D-Maine) and Senate Minority Leader Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.).